

In South Vietnam

U.S. BIGGEST OPERATION FOILED

(February — April 1967)

ERRATA

Page	Line	Instead of	Read
3	4	February—*March* 1967	February — April 1967
10	18	*Tuahai*	Tour no 2
20	25	on March 8	on March 18
36	28	March 6: Attack on height 241 *at Baccua*	March 6: Attack on height 241 north of Cua
39	14	March 3	March 6
	25	March 6, 11 and 2	March 6, 11 and 12
40	18	February 20: Attack on *Buongthung*	February 20: Attack on Buonthung
41	7	6 aircraft	9 aircraft

In South Vietnam

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(February-March 1967)

FOREIGN LANGUAGES PUBLISHING HOUSE
HANOI — 1967

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PUBLISHER'S NOTE

Dry season after dry season the Pentagon longs for a success in the South Vietnam theatre of operations.

No sooner had the 1966 *rainy season ended than U.S. papers and news agencies lavished information about a "thundering" counter-offensive in the* 1966-1967 *dry season.*

By mid-October 1966, *the first round opened with the deployment of* 30,000 *G.I.'s — the biggest build-up so far for an American operation in South Vietnam — against Tayninh, that the Pentagon regarded as the main base of the National Front for Liberation and the Liberation Armed Forces, and a source of constant threat for the Saigon-Cholon area. However, Operation* Attleboro *ended with the loss of* 3,200 *American casualties and the putting out of action of the* 196*th Brigade.*

After two months of readjustment the U.S. Command successively unloosed against the western and the northern parts of Tayninh, one division (Operation Gadsden*), then two brigades (Operation* Tucson*) to pave the way for Operation* Junction City *which involved* 45,000 *G.I.'s with the hope of reversing the tide of the situation in South Vietnam.*

The present booklet gives details on the Tayninh campaign especially on Operation Junction City, *its backbone. It will help the reader understand the developments of the military and political situation in South Vietnam.*

FOREIGN LANGUAGES
PUBLISHING HOUSE
HANOI — 1967

TAYNINH

Tayninh province occupies a military position of great consequence in Eastern Nambo. From the north to the southwest it borders on Cambodia, to the east on Thudaumot province with Highway No 13 well known as a "bloody road" for the Americans and the puppets, to the southeast on Cuchi district, Giadinh province, with a strong guerilla belt.

Tayninh has many important roads, such as Highway No 1 running from Saigon to Cambodia through Trangbang and Godauha, Highway No 22 connecting the western part of the province and Highway No 1, and the provincial road No 4 linking its eastern part to the inter-provincial road No 13 up to Chauthanh district of Thudaumot. Besides, Tayninh is serviced by vital waterways like the Saigon River flowing from the North down to Bensuc, Giadinh and Saigon; the Vamcodong River from the northwest through Godauha down to Tanan and Cholon.

All those communication-lines connect the liberated areas of Duongminhchau (Tayninh), Bensuc (Thudaumot), Duchoa - Duchue (Cholon) and Cuchi (Giadinh) and form a people's war zone menacing the enemy's defence-lines to the northwest of Saigon.

The Tayninh terrain owes its most outstanding feature to the predominance of its forests abounding in big trees, especially in the north. This hampers the enemy's observation both from the air and on the ground, and restricts his mobility on the main arteries.

Aside from its vital position, Tayninh with indomitable Resistance Zone C possesses traditions of heroic struggle. Though the puppet troops have a regiment of the Fifth Division at Godauha, many special forces battalions, commando camps at Traibi, Suoida, Trangsup, etc. (some with 10 companies), and numerous security force and militia units, Tayninh ranks among the Nambo provinces with the strongest popular movement. Starting from political struggle, it has gradually developed its military activities. Early in 1960 it fought no less than ten big engagements: that of Tuahai which remains one of the most resounding exploits in the glorious history of the South Vietnam Liberation Armed Forces (the base of an enemy regiment was destroyed and some 1,000 weapons seized). Since then these "mother guns" have given birth to tens of thousands of others used on many theatres.

With the fiasco of the U.S. "special warfare" strategy and the adoption of the "limited war" strategy, American expeditionary troops came and occupied Tayninh. The U.S. 196th Infantry Brigade and 2,000 Filipino mercenaries were stationed in the provincial capital, a brigade of the U.S. 25th Infantry Brigade at Trangbang. Other brigades from the U.S. First, 25th,

and 4th Infantry Divisions based in the neighbouring provinces of Giadinh, Thudaumot and Bienhoa, often operated in Tayninh.

Moreover, the Americans and puppets rained bombs and bullets and sprayed massive doses of toxic chemicals over this region. On March 31, 1965, 100 planes dropped hundreds of tons of bombs over Boiloi. On April 15, 1965, 400 aircraft of the U.S. air force, navy and marine corps dropped more than 1,000 tons of bombs. Once, for fifteen days on end, B. 52's repeatedly struck at the Duongminhchau area. From late April to early May, 1966, up to 12 tons of poison gas and toxic chemicals were doused over the Tayninh forests.

All this, however, cannot reverse the tide of the situation. The Tayninh armed forces and people have kept on attacking the adversary, narrowing down his occupied zone, and driving him into urban centres along the communication-lines. In the 1966-1967 dry season, promoting their traditions of heroic struggle, they have completely foiled Operation *Junction City*, the most ambitious so far in the U.S. war of aggression against South Vietnam.

U.S. BIGGEST OPERATION SMASHED IN TAYNINH IN THE 1966-67 DRY SEASON

Communiqué of the Eastern Nambo L.A.F. Headquarters (April 22, 1967)

I. — U.S. setbacks during the preparations of the operation*

Since the American imperialists began their massive troop build-up in South Vietnam for direct aggression against our country, they have sustained heavy and repeated defeats. Not reconciling themselves to failure, the White House and the Pentagon bosses have been trying by every means to counter-attack our armed forces and people in an attempt to regain the initiative on the theatres of operations, from whence to wipe out the L.A.F. and wreck revolutionary bases, and win complete victory — military and political.

The U.S. aggressors pinned all their hopes on the dry season when they were in a position to launch major operations in favourable conditions and bring into full play the effectiveness of their weapons and techniques. The first dry-season strategic counter-offensive in 1965-66 ended in a bitter flop with 114,000 officers and men — among them 43,000 Americans put out of action, 1,440 aircraft destroyed or shot down and 1,310 military vehicles (including 330 armoured cars) and 27 warships demolished. In the last monsoon season, Washington's instructions were not to let the situation further deteriorate. They waited for the 1966-1967 dry season to start their second strategic counter-offensive. Ever since, in active preparation for this, they have made great efforts to increase their troop strength and means of war.

Eastern Nambo constituted one of the main theatres chosen by the U.S. Command to realize their plan of conducting "search and destroy" operations against our regular forces and bases. Tayninh was the key area under this plan.

At the beginning of the dry season, the U.S. aggressors undertook a series of actions all of which came to grief. Operation *Attleboro* launched in November 1966 in Tayninh failed disastrously. These initial setbacks dealt a most bitter blow at U.S. leaders' wishful thinking and precipitation. Nevertheless, they went ahead with their preparations for a step-up of activities in the first few months of 1967. With regard to the Tayninh campaign, their preparations were pretty adequate. Many hundreds of vehicles and many scores of military transport planes operated on a round-the-clock basis to bring provisions, arms, munitions and other war equipment to logistic depots in the field. For several months on end, hundreds of aircraft daily scoured the air space over Tayninh, dropping rangers and spies into this hill and forest region for intelligence purposes. Early in February 1967, the operation began.

* *Subtitles are ours. (Publ.)*

On February 2, 1967, the whole U.S. 25th Infantry Division was thrown into an area stretching from Highway No 22 to the Cambodian border. This division-size operation code-named *Gadsden* was aimed at destroying our bases on the western side and chiefly at searching out our forces and driving them to the East of Highway No 22, that is, the principal theatre of the future Operation *Junction City*. It continued even during the Lunar New Year Festival — the cease-fire period — and came to a close on February 21, 1967 with a rather high price for the invaders: 1,964 troops put out of action, including 7 companies completely annihilated and 69 armoured vehicles and 13 aircraft of different types destroyed. The aggressors did not achieve any of their objectives throughout the operation.

On February 14, 1967, they conducted the so-called *Tucson* Operation in the Minhthanh, Dautieng and Bencui areas, which involved the 2nd and 3rd Brigades of the U.S. First Infantry Division for the transport of troops, provisions, and materials into staging areas. This operation terminated on February 21, 1967 with the loss of 334 G.I.'s, 29 armoured cars and 7 planes.

II. — The more ambitious the scheme, the heavier the setbacks

a) JUNCTION CITY I

Both Operations *Gadsden* and *Tucson* formed the prelude to Operation *Junction City* — the most important

of all — directed against the northern and northwestern parts of Tayninh province. From February 22, Westmoreland fielded in an area of only 400 square kilometres to the north and northwest of Tayninh more than 45,000 men belonging to 8 U.S. brigades (3 of the First Infantry Division, 2 of the 25th Infantry Division, the 3rd Brigade of the 4th Infantry Division, the 196th Light Infantry Brigade and the 173th Airborne Brigade), more than 850 armoured cars of the 11th Armoured Regiment and 2 regiments of the 1st and 25th Divisions, over 200 guns and numerous aircraft of various types. Thus, the U.S. Command threw into the battle nearly all the mobile forces they could possibly mobilize in Eastern Nambo. This was an army-corps-size operation directly under Lieutenant General Jonathan O. Seaman, commander of the 2nd American Task Force in South Vietnam. The enemy boasted that this was the biggest operation ever conducted in South Vietnam with the following objectives:

1. To destroy our bases in the northern and northwestern parts of Tayninh province.

2. To smash the leading bodies of the N.F.L. and the L.A.F. which they thought were located in the region.

3. To wipe out part of our regular forces, or "Division 9" as they called, that they thought to be also there.

4. To create a shield for the puppet troops engaged in "pacification" work in the southern part of the province, thus removing the serious threat against their bases in Saigon-Cholon.

5. To win a notable victory, paving the way for the execution of the "pincers" strategy in 1967 and later on.

Opening Operation *Junction City* at that time, the U.S. aggressors had some advantages: with a large effective and modern means of transport, they could deploy their troops rapidly; they had plenty of time and material means to prepare for their operational plans; the dry season was also favourable for them to make full use of their weapons and techniques. Furthermore, they could draw experience from their recent setbacks in operations *Attleboro*, *Cedar Falls* and others.

The operation commenced in an impressive way.

On the night of February 21, in many waves, B-52's bombed many places to the north, near the Cambodian border, to prepare for a landing zone.

At 6 a.m. on February 22, the 173rd Airborne Brigade landed at Catum, while the 1st Infantry Division swept into Socmoi and Rumduon to seal off the border in the north.

On the same day, the 2nd Brigade of the 25th Infantry Division deployed along Highway No 22 to cover the western flank. Meanwhile, one brigade of the First Infantry Division closed in from the east along Highway No 4.

Having sealed off the northern side and shielded the eastern and western flanks, the enemy dispatched a strong column comprising one brigade of the 25th Infantry Division and the 11th Armoured Regiment as the main prong to drive from the south into the main

operational theatre. Arriving at Dongpan, this column detached a motorized force to press westward along the freshly cleared Socky road forming a transversal line to seal off the area in the south. Thus, the aggressors realized an encirclement laying — as they put it — a vast "horseshoe" around the operational theatre. All that was completed on February 22. The Americans indulged in braggadocio as though victory was already in sight. As a matter of fact, they had carefully and minutely prepared for the operation. Their troop deployment was so impressive that some people could have thought that even a mosquito could not escape from their hands. But it turned out that all the classical concepts of American military art could not match with the people's war line and art of the South Vietnamese armed forces and people, with the result that the U.S. aggressors had to receive one staggering blow after another.

On February 22, when officers and men of the 173rd Airborne Brigade were still floating in the air, they were "welcomed" by guerillas of Catum with rounds of rifle and machinegun fire. Many of them lost their lives before touching the ground. Seven aircraft were brought down in the first few minutes. Also in the Catum area, one paratroop company was completely wiped out by the guerillas.

The same day our guerillas pressed hard on the adversary along Highway No 22 and Highway No 4, destroying many vehicles. In particular, the main attacking column was sweeping out from the south into the central zone when it was heavily engaged at Dongvo during most of the day and could not advance

a single step. Air and artillery support was provided but it could not do away with the guerillas' encirclement. The thrusts were thus broken at the very start of the operation.

On February 22 alone, the guerillas knocked out over 300 GI's, and destroyed 20 vehicles and 16 aircraft.

Between the 23rd and 28th of February, adverse troops fanned out from their enclaves on search missions into our bases. Then they were still very aggressive. Their armoured cars recklessly moved into places where they thought our forces or storages were located. They, however, dashed at an open door while the L.A.F. continued sticking to them, and assaulted them at propitious moments. Our forces fought without let-up and achieved brilliant successes, inflicting heavy losses on the enemy. On February 26, they wiped out 150 of the invaders at Trangalan, west of Highway No 22; two days later, they caused another 130 American casualties at Giengthi. In only 10 days, at Tadat the guerillas put out of action 800 enemy troops, 49 vehicles and 5 aircraft, while at Socky they bagged nearly 700 men, 31 vehicles and 10 aircraft. Faced with surprise attacks, ambushes, shelling and mining by guerillas the GI's gradually lost the truculence they had displayed at the outset. Moreover, the L.A.F. thrusted into adverse staging areas in an audacious surprise-attack, wiping out an armoured squadron with over 200 GI's put out of action at Suoionghung. The enemy began wavering. When stumbling upon a guerilla squad, even a whole battalion did not dare advance and called for air and artillery support. But

what frightened them most was that they were still unable to "search out" our regular forces. The danger of annihilation engagements being fought by our regulars haunted them, officers and men alike. After only a week, all enemy columns were whittled down and thrown into disorder. It took them five days (March 1-5) to consolidate and replenish their troops. A puppet marine force of several battalions was hurled at Tayninh to fill the American casualty gap.

On March 6, the enemy fanned out again for new actions only to find themselves heavily shelled at Taxia and suffered 700 casualties. Later, the L.A.F. attacked at Dongken, killed 100 enemy troops, while at Benra (5 km northwest of Logo) they wiped out another 150 and destroyed 6 armoured cars. The guerrillas engaged their opponent hundreds of times, seriously wearing down his man-power. While the invaders' "horseshoe"-battle array was upset by blows from all sides, they received repeated punches at their flanks at Dongpan and Bauco on Highway No 4 on the night of March 10.

At Dongpan, our troops made a surprise attack on the staging area of one U.S. brigade, putting out of action 500 GI's, 170 military vehicles (including 50 amoured cars), 12 artillery pieces and one helicopter. That same night, they struck at the logistic base for Operation *Junction City* at Bauco, destroying 64 military vehicles (among these 24 armoured cars), 9 guns and knocked down 200 GI's. The aggressors felt puzzled and confused after our actions at Dongpan and Bauco. On March 13, various American columns began fleeing away, leaving behind bridges, fortifications and

airfields they had built up for a long-term operation. All badly hurt U.S. units returned to their bases, except for the 196th Light Infantry Brigade which fell back on Highway No 4. By March 15, our armed forces and people had virtually driven the invaders out of the northern and northwestern parts of Tayninh province. The first stage of Operation *Junction City* thus ended in a fiasco. As a result, we put out of action 5,859 troops, mostly Americans, 497 military vehicles (352 armoured cars), 90 aircraft of different types and 50 artillery pieces. The enemy casualty list included 7 infantry companies, one battalion and 5 companies of artillery, and 3 armoured squadrons, completely annihilated. Driven out of the northern and northwestern parts of Tayninh when they still had at their disposal a large effective, tanks and guns but could not achieve a single objective of the operation, the humiliated U.S. aggressors remained dumb as fish. They did not, however, reconcile themselves to defeat.

b) JUNCTION CITY II

In an attempt to take their revenge they launched another operation—that we call *Junction City II* for convenience' sake — in the northeastern part of Tayninh. While their men stationed in rear bases had not yet been reinforced, on March 8, 5 U.S. brigades and many armoured and artillery units which had just experienced a heavy setback in northwestern Tayninh were thrown again into the northeastern zone of the province. This army-corps-size operation unfolded in a

hasty and passive manner with the hope of somehow materializing the big ambitions which the U.S. aggressors had failed to realize in Operation *Junction City I*.

Unlike previously this time the Americans did not pour in massive airborne forces and deploy them in a horseshoe-battle array. Instead, they dispatched separate brigades to attack definite areas.

On March 18, their armoured and infantry units advancing from Locninh settled down at Dongrum. The following day, more troops were brought in to build up a strong column with the 3rd Brigade of the 4th Infantry Division.

On March 20, from Highway No 13, U.S. troops, together with puppet Ranger Battalion No 36, moved in and held Soccontrang to cover the landing, the next day, of the 2nd Brigade of the 1st Infantry Division at Bautanken, some 6km northwest of Soccontrang. Thus, the enemy disposed of another column on the northeastern side of the operational theatre.

On March 22, an armoured unit from Soccontrang reached Baucham, 10 km away to the southwest while other troops were landed at Baucot and Vauvenven to form a 3rd column with elements of the 173rd Airborne Brigade.

To support those columns, on March 24 the Americans dispatched one more U.S. battalion to Dongken, east-northeast of Locninh, and many puppet ranger companies to operate in areas surrounding U.S. encampments. In addition, at Dongpan and on Highway No 4, the 196th Light Infantry Brigade was assigned to protect the eastern flank of the operational zone.

The afore-mentioned columns were disposed into "clusters", forming a cordon around an area of about 450 square kilometres. From these "clusters", detachments were to fan out and close in so as to establish a tight encirclement. As a next step, 3 reserve brigades (3rd Brigade of the 1st Infantry Division, 1st Brigade of the 25th Infantry Division, and 1st Brigade of the 9th Infantry Division) would be hurled into the central area to achieve all the objectives set for the operation. As can be seen, the U.S. plan was pretty adequate and dangerous. But, once again the adversary met with humiliating defeat.

Like guerillas in northwestern Tayninh, those in the northeastern part of the province pressed hard on the invaders from the very beginning.

On March 18, 9 enemy armoured cars were destroyed while moving from Locninh to Dongrum. On March 19, adverse aircraft landed on a minefield laid by the guerillas at Dongrum and 8 of them were destroyed together with more than 100 troops. At Tanken, one platoon was annihilated upon landing. At Trangtram, a U.S. battalion was pinned down by a guerilla unit and, after a week, had to flee away. Similar engagements took place every day at all enemy columns.

Most significant were the fights at Dongrum, Trangsuoingo and Bautaxiet.

On March 21, our troops started a surprise attack against Dongrum, wiping out one infantry battalion, 3 armoured squadrons comprising 72 tanks and A.P.C.'s, 18 artillery pieces and 10 aircraft of different types. They also heavily whittled down another infantry

battalion. Over 1,200 enemy troops were put out of action. The 3rd Brigade of the 4th Infantry Division had to withdraw to Dautieng to be reinforced by 1,000 men and reorganized.

Earlier — March 19 — on the main transport artery of Operation *Junction City* — Highway No 13—the resourceful and ingenious liberation fighters struck a hammering blow at a reinforcement and supply convoy at Dongpan, knocking down more than 400 men and destroying 92 vehicles of different kinds, including 2 armoured squadrons comprising 65 tanks and A.P.C.'s.

The initial splendid engagements fought by the L.A.F. dealt a heavy blow at Operation *Junction City II*. Right on the first few days, the enemy column at Dongrum, though having been replenished, shrank back visibly.

On March 30, one U.S. battalion was landed at Trangsuoingo, 12 km southwest of Soccontrang. The next day, our forces knocked down 2 companies, compelling the enemy to bring in 2 more battalions. That night, our troops pressed them hard, and at 4 a.m. on the following day, they wiped out one infantry battalion and destroyed 12 aircraft at Trangsuoingo. At the same time, they contained the enemy in nearby positions by shelling, causing notable losses to them. An artillery battalion at Soccontrang was also heavily thinned down.

On March 28, an adverse column moved up to Bautaxiet from the south, but engaged by our forces, it lost 200 men and one armoured squadron comprising 23 tanks and A.P.C's.

CAMBODIA
THU DAU MOT
HA-NOI
SAI-GON
N
Trang Nganh-nganh
An-khac
Xom-mai
Rum-duon
Xa-mach
Ca-tum
Ta-dat
Tan-ken
Soc Con-trang
Hon-quan
Bau Lung-tung
Bay-bau
Dong-vo
Bo-tuc
Ben-ra
Ta-xia
Can-dang
Lo-go
Soc-ky
Dong-rum
Suoi Ngo
Bau-cham
Bau Ven-ven
Can-dam
Oleng-thi
Ta-xiet
Ta-pong
Trai-bi
Bau-co
Cha-do
Dong-ken
Minh-thanh
Chon-thanh
Khe-don
Loc-ninh
Vo-tung
985
Ba-den
Suoi-da
Bau-gon
TAY-NINH
Suoi Ong-hung
Dau-tieng
Bau-bang
Cau-khoi
Vam Co Dong River
Saigon River
Bau-don
Ben-suc
Ben-cat
Go-dau-ha
N.R. No 13
N.R. No 22
N.R. No 1
P.R. 4
I.R. No 19
I.R. No 26
I.R. No 14
I.R. No 13
LEGEND
Landing of heliborne troops
Landing of paratroops
Enemy's advance (motorised troops)
Enemy's advance (infantry)
Enemy's retreat
L.A.F.'s attack
L.A.F.'s shelling of enemy bases
Interception of enemy troops by the L.A.F.
Provincial capital
District town
Scale 1/500,000

All those encounters, together with hundreds of others fought by the guerillas, and the co-ordinated actions of the armed forces and people of Binhlong province, had forced the U.S. columns to recoil. The intention of the American commanders to tighten the noose remained unrealized.

To sidetrack us, the Americans sent a detachment on March 28 from Highway No 4 to Catum, which deployed at Socmoi and Rumduon with a view to attracting our forces towards that direction. But their trick was too transparent. Badly trounced on all sides, the enemy columns were in the constant danger of being annihilated and, under continuous attacks, became weary and confused. The U.S. commanders chose to scuttle off.

On April 1, they left Dongrum. On April 2, they abandoned Catum. On April 5, the column at Dongken fell back to Dautieng. Between the 6th and 9th of April enemy troops at Suoingo withdrew step by step to Soccontrang. By April 13, the whole enemy force at Soccontrang had completely withdrawn and thus, by that day, our armed forces and people had driven all the enemy troops out of the northeastern part of Tayninh province. Operation *Junction City II* ended in bitter failure. In countering this operation, our armed forces and people put out of action 5,643 enemy troops, mostly Americans, destroyed 500 military vehicles, including 351 A.P.C.'s, 57 aircraft and 40 artillery pieces. Two infantry battalions and 4 companies, one artillery battalion and 6 armoured squadrons were completely wiped out.

From February 2 to April 13, in frustrating Operations *Gadsden*, *Tucson* and *Junction City*, our armed forces and people killed or wounded nearly 14,000 enemy troops, mostly Americans, destroyed or damaged over 1,000 vehicles of various types, including 801 tanks and A.P.C.'s, shot down or damaged 167 aircraft and more than 90 artillery pieces. The casualty list included 2 battalions and 18 companies of infantry, 2 battalions and 5 companies of artillery, 9 armoured squadrons completely wiped out, along with 3 infantry battalions, one airborne battalion and one artillery battalion heavily decimated.

III. — U.S. setbacks on other theatres

In co-ordination with the Tayninh armed forces and people, the L.A.F. on the eastern Nambo theatre spread thin the enemy and attacked him everywhere, inflicting crushing blows on both the Americans and the puppets.

In Bienhoa, on April 4 our forces shelled for the second time the Suoiram base of the U.S. 11th Armoured Regiment, which has just returned there after having sustained setbacks in Tayninh, putting out of action over 1,000 GI's and 200 military vehicles — mostly armoured cars — and destroying 30 artillery pieces and 34 helicopters. On the night of April 7, our forces burned 1,200,000 litres of gasoline at the Benthuy fuel depot in Bienhoa provincial capital. They attacked for the fourth time the U.S. logistic base at Longbinh on February 4, demolishing 40 storages,

900,000 shells for 105-mm, 155-mm, 175-mm and 203-mm guns, and 22 armoured cars, and wiping out 350 GI's. In an attack against the Bienhoa strategic air base on February 7, they destroyed 8,000 napalm bombs and burned 100,0000 litres of gasoline.

On February 16, the armed forces and people of Thudaumot ambushed an enemy convoy heading for village No 18 in Dautieng, destroying 13 M.113 armoured personnel carriers and 2 M-41 tanks. On March 14, they launched their 5th attack on Phuloi airfield, wiped out over 200 GI's and destroyed 6 armoured cars and 15 aircraft.

In Baria, on February 16 the L.A.F. knocked down 100 Australian troops and destroyed 5 tanks and M.113's engaged in a mission to relieve the battered troops at Hoimy village, Longdien-Datdo district, when the 4th puppet Battalion, 52nd Regiment, 10th Division, stationed at Suoicat was wiped out with 250 men killed.

In Binhlong, on April 8 our forces shelled an American position at Binhphu, 12 km trom Honquan town, wiping out over 200 U.S. aggressors, and destroying 4 105-mm and 155-mm guns.

On the other South Vietnam theatres our armed forces and people also harmoniously co-ordinated their actions, striking hard at the enemy and winning big successes. From February 15 to March 21, in Quangtri, Thuathien, Bentre, Longan, Quangngai and Gialai provinces, they annihilated 15 American and puppet infantry and artillery battalions and armoured squadrons, wiping out some ten thousand American,

puppet and satellite troops. Meanwhile, the armed forces and people in western and central Nambo, in central and southern Trungbo and in the Saigon-Giadinh area mounted vigorous attacks against enemy bases, wiped out "pacification" teams and a sizable U.S.-satellite man-power.

IV. — The great significance of the Tayninh victory

The whole Operation *Junction City* was frustrated by our armed forces and people. The aggressors met with complete and all-round failure:

Far from finding out and destroying any L.A.F. unit, they lost over one-fourth of their troops, nearly half of their artillery and nine-tenths of their motorized vehicles thrown into Tayninh.

Far from finding out and destroying any of our leading bodies, they had to remove such a topbrass hat as J.O. Seaman, and replace Cabot Lodge while Westmoreland's and even Johnson's positions have become much more shaky.

Far from destroying our bases or discovering any of our storages, they were tied down and exhausted in in the jungle of Tayninh, decimated by diseases and tropical heat.

Far from winning any military victory to bolster up the morale of the American and puppet troops, their defeats have demoralized them still further.

Far from being able to lend any support to the puppet troops in their "pacification" job, they caused

the "pacification" cadres of the Saigon administration to suffer heavier casualties as a result of the U.S. troops involvement in Tayninh, which left the other places more exposed than ever to L.A.F. attacks.

In addition, through this operation, the enemy, in face of the staunch and battle-hardened L.A.F., has revealed his basic weak points and sharp contradictions. Among the weak points there was the seriously low and constantly sinking morale of the American troops, resulting from a leadership which had counted on firepower as the chief means of decimating and annihilating the opponent, while relegating the infantry to the secondary role of a detecting, blocking and supporting force. Therefore, one found more and more GI's bursting into tears before stacks of their buddies' bodies wrapped in plastic bags, showing lack of combativeness in fighting, pulling back or fleeing away when encountered by the L.A.F., or crouching low inside their fortifications when attacked. There were contradictions between the big ambitions of the U.S. commanders and the possibilities of carrying them out, as well as the indifferent fighting capacity of the U.S. troops.

From the tactical point of view, the Americans found themselves in a worsening impasse because of their poor military intelligence work and their inability to tightly encircle their adversary in each engagement in spite of their high operational mobility. Neither their "armoured tactic" nor their "heliborne tactic" could cope with the ubiquitousness of the L.A.F. capable of turning up and fading away unexpectedly.

Their tactic of "casting the nest and throwing the javelin *" too, proved futile because their nest was holed and their javelin unspiked. Air and artillery firepower — the sole strong point of the American forces—was largely limited by our troops in many ways: observing secrecy of movement, building solid fortifications, tying and whittling down and destroying aircraft and artillery, fighting rapidly and at close range which constitute the force of the L.A.F., etc.

The failure of Operation *Junction City* crippled the U.S. "pincers" plan. The hope for a dry-season strategic counter-offensive that the Americans pinned on this operation had evaporated.

As for our armed forces and people, the Tayninh victory has brought out many new points:

Our entire people and L.A.F made adequate, all-round preparations. With much truculence the U.S. aggressors launched a massive attack involving nearly three infantry divisions and a large number of aircraft, artillery pieces and armoured vehicles. Right from the start our armed forces and people calmly and valiantly met them. No sooner had the enemy completed his battle-array than they delivered counter-blows at all times, in all places and at all his services. Throughout the operation, he constantly came under powerful surprise attacks and heavy shelling.

Our regional troops and guerillas fought very well and gave full expression to their determination to fight and to win. They stuck to their opponent, encountered

* One way of hunting in Vietnam.

him unremittingly and broke many of his thrusts, using different types of mines of their own making and all other weapons at their disposal. The eagerness of the whole people taking part in the fight has been more clearly manifested than ever before. In fact, nearly half the enemy's total casualties (6,500), more than one half of his military vehicles destroyed (412), and over two-thirds of his aircraft downed or destroyed (119) went to the credit of the guerillas and regional troops.

Our regular forces displayed high mobility, ensured complete secrecy of movement and seized every opportunity to deal telling blows of great tactical and operational significance. Our artillery has made a major stride forward and struck fear to the Americans with its powerful and accurate fire. The close co-ordination between our infantry and artillery, between our regulars and guerillas, between the Tayninh and other theatres, greatly embarrassed the enemy who had to cope with many attacks at the same time. Our regulars, regionals and guerillas helped one another to win successes.

In dealing with this operation, our armed forces and people put out of action a large number of armoured cars, thus shaking the moral prop of the U.S. troops. Many GI's, when encountered, left their A.P.C's to run for life, losing faith in their steel plate, very thick but unable to resist the mines and modern anti-tank weapons of the L.A.F.

The Tayninh victory throws a stronger light on the correctness of our people's war line and aggravates the enemy's weak points as regards the morale of the troops, even the U.S. equipment, weaponry, techniques

and tactics. It demonstrates still more clearly the full capability of our armed forces and people to break any large-scale operation of the adversary and to smash "pincers" plan so as to strike staggering blows at his aggressive will.

The Tayninh victory was one of the heaviest blows to the U.S. second dry-season strategic counter-offensive. To a large extent it will affect the whole 1967 plan of the enemy since the outcome of the fighting in the first quarter of the year is of the greatest significance for this plan. Without a smooth start how can he achieve a successful end?

However, the aggressors are very obdurate and brutal. They will seek every way to snatch a military victory, and to this end they will increase their effectives and means of war, stop at no savagery in their future counter-attacks. For them our Tayninh base area remains a key point at which they will intensify their strikes. But, our local armed forces and people, taking avail of their recent successes, heightening their vigilance and their determination to fight and to win, will certainly deliver them still more stinging blows.

MAJOR ENGAGEMENTS ON OTHER THEATRES

From February 2 to April 13, 1967 the L.A.F. inflicted heavy setbacks on the American aggressors not only in the Tayninh region but also on all other South Vietnam theatres from Quangtri-Thuathien up north to Camau down south.

A. — TRUNGBO

I — Quangtri - Thuathien theatre

February 4	Attack on Quangdien military subsector	300 puppet troops wiped out (including one company of civil guards annihilated, 50 others captured, 2 helicopters downed, 3 M.113 armoured cars set afire)
Night of February 6	Attack on Namgiao shooting range	More than 100 enemy troops knocked down, 50 military vehicles destroyed

February 18-22	Enemy incursion into Phongdien district intercepted and foiled by Quangdien guerillas	320 troops (among them 5 G.I's, 1 puppet major and 1 puppet junior lieutenant) knocked out
February 27	Enemy raid at Tankim, Camlo district, ambushed at Mount Dabac, north of Highway 9	2 U.S. companies wiped out, 6 tanks and armoured cars set ablaze
Night of February 26 and 28, and March 3	Shelling of Docmieu position, Giolinh, Quangtri province	Over 300 Americans knocked down, 7 artillery pieces destroyed
Night of March 2	Pounding of Tacon airfield, Hunghoa district, Quangtri province.	70 Yankees knocked out, 5 helicopters, 12 military vehicles and 1 oil depot destroyed
March 1-4	Attack on 5 U.S. companies raiding Catson, Baison, south of Giolinh	600 G.I'.s wiped out, 5 tanks set afire, 3 helicopters downed
March 5	Ambush against 1 U.S. battalion raiding Trungan, north of Camlo	215 Americans knocked out, 3 helicopters downed, 3 tanks set ablaze
March 6	Attack on height 241 at Baccua on Highway 9	One artillery position razed, 21 175-mm and 105-mm guns destroyed, 1,450 Yankees knocked down
Night of March 10 and dawn of March 11	Attack on Phuthue military subsector, Phuvang, Thuathien province, and rescuing party	Nearly 300 enemy troops wiped out, including one civil guard company annihilated

March 17	Enemy raid in Trieuthanh and Trieudo villages smashed by Trieuphong guerillas and regional troops	312 U.S. and puppet troops knocked out, 7 M.113 armoured cars damaged, one fighter plane downed
Night of March 20 and dawn of March 21	U.S. artillery position at Docmieu, Giolinh, shelled by the Vinhlinh armed forces	17 heavy artillery pieces, 57 military vehicles, 5 aircraft destroyed, 1,070 G.I.'s knocked out
Morning of March 21	A military convoy ambushed	15 munition-loaded vehicles destroyed, 30 G.I.'s wiped out
Night of April 5, dawn of April 6	Surprise attacks on Quangtri provincial capital and on Lavang position, Quangtri, and Tuha position, 8km from Hue	2 headquarters of puppet 1st and 3rd Regiments knocked down, one battalion, 9 companies, 8 platoons, 2 armoured squadrons, and one tank company annihilated; one battalion badly mauled, over 200 military vehicles, 3 aircraft destroyed; 3 arms depots, 2 petrol dumps and other storages set afire; Quangtri town controlled by L.A.F. for many hours, nearly 1,650 enemy troops knocked out; Tuha and Lavang positions razed to the ground

II – Central Trungbo theatre

Quangnam

February 22	Raid on an enemy sea base at Hoian	3 combat motorized junks of the puppet navy sunk, many enemy troops wiped out
Night of February 27, dawn of March 15	Two attacks on Danang air base	110 aircraft, 231 military vehicles, a two-million-litre petrol dump and an underground radar station destroyed, 1,586 G.I.'s killed or wounded
Night of March 5	Attack on Chulai base for the fifth time	300 G.I.'s knocked down, 40 aircraft and a radar station destroyed
Night of March 12	Attack on Hieunhon military subsector	166 puppet troops killed and captured, nearly 60 weapons seized
From March 9 to 15	Enemy raids countered by guerillas and regional troops of Tamky district	Some 670 enemy troops, mostly American, knocked out, 2 helicopters downed
March 24	A military convoy ambushed on Highway 1 from Baren to Huongan	148 vehicles destroyed, 59 others damaged, 380 U.S., puppet and Pak Jung Hi troops wiped out

Quangngai

February 15	Raid on Quangthanh, Sonkim village, Sontinh district	One Pak Jung Hi battalion, *Blue Dragon* Brigade (500 men) knocked down
February 17	A puppet combat team intercepted at Anmy, Tunghia	Special forces Battalion No 37 annihilated, 2 other battalions badly mauled
February 19	A puppet combat team intercepted at Tanphuoc, Hungnhuong, Sontinh district	Paratroop Battalion No 7 wiped out, another battalion heavily decimated
Night of March 3	Attack on the military airfield of Quangngai provincial capital by regional troops	150 puppet troops knocked down
Night of March 11	Attack on the puppet training school at Quangngai provincial capital	130 puppet troops knocked out, 50 weapons (among which 8 mortars and heavy machine-guns) seized

Binhdinh

March 6, 11, and 2	Three enemy raids against Myloc, Mytai and Myphong villages, Phumy district, smashed	750 G.I.'s wiped out (including almost one battalion), 7 aircraft downed

Phuyen

April 10	Raid on a position of Pak Jung Hi mercenaries	2 companies knocked down and badly mauled (among them 155 killed), 6 DKZs destroyed, many weapons captured (among which 5 machine-guns)

III—Western High Plateaux theatre

Kontum

February 15 March 14	Repeated attacks on the Sathay area and south of Highway 19	17 companies and the C.P. of a U.S. Brigade wiped out (over 2,020 enemy troops, mostly American), 24 aircraft downed, 34 military vehicles and 12 105-mm and 175-mm guns, destroyed

Darlac

February 20	Attack on Buongthung, south of Buonho	Puppet 1st Battalion, 45th Regiment knocked out

Gialai

Night of April 8 and dawn of April 9	Fourth attack on the helicopter base of the U.S. 1st Airmobile Cavalry Division	28 aircraft destroyed, some 120 G.I.'s knocked down

IV — South Trungbo theatre

Khanhhoa

Night of March 14	Raid on Nhatrang military airfield	26 aircraft and 6 vehicles destroyed, 100 G.I.'s wiped out

Binhthuan

From March 13 to 19	3 U.S. battalions intercepted by guerillas and regional troops	259 G.I.'s knocked out, 6 aircraft downed (among which one Flying Crane)

B. — NAMBO

I — Eastern Nambo theatre

Bienhoa

February 4	Fourth attack on the U.S. logistic base at Longbinh	40 stores, 900,000 shells of 105-mm, 155-mm, 175-mm and 203-mm guns, 22 vehicles destroyed and 350 G.I.'s wiped out
February 7	Attack on Bienhoa strategic air base	8,000 napalm bombs destroyed, 1,000,000 litres of petrol set afire
March 21	Enemy attacked north of Budop, north of Bienhoa	3 puppet companies wiped out or decimated, 2 aircraft downed

March 21	Enemy intercepted at Suoicat, Bienhoa	Puppet 4th Battalion, 52nd Regiment, 10th Division, knocked down
April 4	2nd attack on the Suoiram position of the 11th Armoured Regiment	More than 1,000 G.I.', knocked out, 200 vehicles, mostly armoured cars, and 30 artillery pieces, 34 helicopters and 80 tent barracks, destroyed
April 7	Shelling of the Benthuy petrol dump, Bienhoa town	1,200,000 litres of petrol set afire

Thudaumot

February 16	An enemy motorized convoy intercepted at village 18, Dautieng	13 M.113 cars and 2 M.41 tanks destroyed
March 14	5th attack on Phuloi airfield	More than 200 G.I.'s wiped out, 6 armoured cars and 15 aircraft destroyed
March 19	Attack on a combat team of the U.S. 9th Division encamped on Highway 13 at Baubang	2 armoured squadrons knocked down, 92 vehicles including 65 tanks and armoured cars damaged

Baria

February 16	Attack on the Australian mercenaries coming to rescue the enemy at Hoimy village, Longdien district, Datdo	100 troops and 5 tanks and armoured cars knocked out
February 16	Attack on the puppets at Suoicat	250 puppets of the 4th Battalion, 52nd Regiment, 10th Division, wiped out

Binhlong

April 8	Shelling of the U.S. position at Binhphu, 12km from Honquan	More than 200 G.I.'s knocked down, 4 105-mm and 155-mm guns destroyed

Cuchi, Giadinh

February 26	Raid on Caytrac position at Phumy hamlet, Phuhoa village, Cuchi district	2 American and one puppet companies annihilated, 17 tanks, 2 half-tracks and 3 105-mm guns destroyed
Night of March 15	Heavy pounding of the U.S. base at Dongdu, Cuchi district	300 G.I's wiped out, one ammunition dump and one oil depot set afire, 10 aircraft, 36 vehicles and 3 203-mm guns destroyed and damaged

Night of March 31	Attack on the puppet Special Forces Battalion No 37 based at Phuocthach, Saigon-Giadinh area	2 companies (some 300 men) knocked down, another company badly mauled, one aircraft downed

II — Mekong River delta theatre

February 6	Attack on Highway 8, Hoakhanh village, Duchoa district, Cholon	One puppet battalion knocked down
February 18	Attack on Tanthanh, Bentre	Puppet special forces Battalion No 41 annihilated (600 enemy troops), 4 aircraft and 2 155-mm guns destroyed
Night of February 24	Fourth attack on Tranoc airfield, Cantho	17 aircraft and 180 enemy troops destroyed
Night of March 8	Shelling of the base of the U.S. 3rd Brigade, 9th Infantry Division at Binhduc, Chau thanh district, Mytho	150 GI's wiped out, 2 helicopters destroyed
March 13	Attack on the headquarters of Huongmy military subsector, Mytho	3 positions razed, another garrison forced to withdraw, 2 companies and 5 platoons of the puppets annihilated (nearly 300 enemy troops killed or wounded)

March 23	A U.S naval convoy bound for Bentre provincial capital and a puppet naval convoy sailing from Vinhlong on the Hamluong River, intercepted	10 warships wiped out (including 6 sunk on spot), more than 1,000 enemy troops put out of action (among them 2 U.S. companies annihilated)
March 26	5th attack on Tranoc airfield, Cantho	25 aircraft destroyed and damaged, 177 Americans and puppets knocked down
March 22-31	Attack on the Mangthit river in Vinhlong and Travinh provinces	More than 1,000 enemy troops knocked out, one puppet battalion annihilated, 3 other battalions badly mauled, 11 aircraft downed, 15 others damaged, 2 warships sunk, 7 posts razed or compelled to withdraw
March 8-30	Two enemy raids to herd the population into "strategic hamlets" broken in Duchoa district, Cholon	853 enemy troops, including 703 G.I.'s, wiped out
Night of April 1	13th attack on Soctrang airfield	12 aircraft destroyed

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U.S. BIGGEST OPERATION FOILED

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